New Research in Economic Theory

19 West 4th Street Room 624, Th 16.15-18.30 NYU 2021-22

Instructor: Debraj Ray

Here is a list of papers that we might be discussing through the year. It is expected that all of us will have read each paper in advance of the meeting in which that paper is to be discussed.

You are welcome to add papers in your area of interest, but clear them with the instructor first.

Second-year students taking the class for credit must submit a referee report on the paper a day in advance.

Journals you can use to find papers in:

Theoretical Economics


Journal of Economic Theory

Games and Economic Behavior

Some Papers (in no particular order):

Yeon-Koo Che and Konrad Mierendorff, Optimal Dynamic Allocation of Attention

Qingmin Liu, Konrad Mierendorff, Xianwen Shi, and Weijie Zhong, Auctions with Limited Commitment

Qingmin Liu, "Stability and Bayesian Consistency in Two-Sided Markets."

Matthew Elliott and Ben Golub, A Network Approach to Public Goods 

Matthew Elliott, Ben Golub and Matthew Jackson, Financial Networks and Contagion

Toomas Hinnosaar, Optimal Sequential Contests

Debraj Ray and Rajiv Vohra, "Games of Love and Hate"

Antony Millner, Nondogmatic Social Discounting

Annie Liang and Xiaosheng Mu, Complementary Information and Learning Traps

Annie Liang, Xiaosheng Mu and Vasilis Syrgkanis, Dynamically Aggregating Diverse Information

Mohammad Akbarpour, Piotr Dworczak and Scott Duke Kominers, Redistribution through Markets

Mohammad Akbarpour and Shengwu Li, Credible Mechanisms: A Trilemma

Elliot Lipnowski and Evan Sadler, Peer-Confirming Equilibrium

Elliot Lipnowski and Doron Ravid, Cheap Talk with Transparent Motives

Doron Ravid, Anne-Katrin Roesler and Balazs Szentes, Learning Before Trading: On the Inefficiency of Ignoring Free Information 

Nageeb Ali, Maximilian Mihm and Lucas Siga, Adverse Selection in Distributive Politics

Andrew McClellan, Experimentation and Approval Mechanisms

Daniel Clark, Drew Fudenberg and Alex Wolitsky: Steady-State Equilibria in Anonymous Repeated Games, I: Trigger Strategies in General Stage Games  and Steady-State Equilibria in Anonymous Repeated Games, II: Coordination-Proof Strategies in the Prisoner's Dilemma

Alex Wolitsky, Learning from Others' Outcomes

Dirk Bergemann, Benjamin Brooks, and Stephen Morris, "The Limits of Price Discrimination

Dirk Bergemann, Benjamin Brooks, and Stephen Morris, "Search, Information and Prices."

Erik Eyster, Shengwu Li, and Sarah Ridout, "A Theory of Ex-Post Rationalization."

T. Nguyen and R. Vohra, "Near-Feasible Stable Matchings with Couples."

Motty Perry and Phil Reny, "How to Count Citations if You Must."

A. Lizzeri and L. Yariv, "Collective Self-Control."

O Compte and P. Jehiel, "The Coalitional Nash Bargaining Solution."

D. Bergeman and J. Valimaki, "Bandit Problems." May be better for reading than for presenting as it's a survey.

Jon Eguia and Dimitrios Xefteris, "Implementation by Vote-Buying Mechanisms."

Rahul Deb, Mallesh Pai and Maher Said, "Evaluating Strategic Forecasters."

Aislinn Bohren, Alex Imas and Michael Rosemberg, "The Dynamics of Discrimination: Theory and Evidence." 

Nima Haghpanah, Elliot Lipnowski and Aditya Kuvalekar, "Selling to a Group.

Avidit Acharya, Elliot Lipnowski and João Ramos, "Optimal Political Career Dynamics."  

Paula Onuchic and Debraj Ray, "Signaling and Discrimination in Collaborative Projects."