Syllabus (Preliminary; will be updated)

If there is any single text for this course it is D. Fudenberg and J. Tirole, Game Theory (MIT Press) [FT]. I will follow the book (but with several variations) for the first several topics. I will also refer to M. Osborne and A. Rubinstein, A Course in Game Theory (MIT Press) [OR].

Games. Pure and Mixed Strategies. Nash Equilibrium.

FT, 1.

OR, 3.1 and 3.2.

P. Reny and A. Robson (2002), "Reinterpreting Mixed Strategy Equilibria: A Unification of the Classical and Bayesian Views.''

Foundations for Nash Equilibrium. Dominated strategies. Iterated Elimination. Rationalizability. Applications of Iterated Dominance. Correlated Equilibrium. Comments on Knowledge.

FT, 2.1 and 2.2

OR, 3.3 and 4.

D. Bernheim (1984), "Rationalizable Strategic Behavior," Econometrica 52, 1007--1028.

D. Pearce (1984), "Rationalizable Strategic Behavior and the Problem of Perfection," Econometrica 52, 1029--1050.

R. Aumann (1987) "Correlated Equilibrium as an Expression of Bayesian Rationality," Econometrica 55, 1-18.

OR, 5.

FT, 14.1--14.3.

R. Aumann and A. Brandenberger (1995), "Epistemic Conditions for Nash Equilibrium," Econometrica 63, 1161--80.

Refinements of Nash. Weak-Dominance. Trembling-Hand. Pareto-Dominance. Risk-Dominance. Coalition-Proofness.

Bernheim-Peleg-Whinston

Harsanyi-Selten

Farrell

Van Damme

Applications of CPNE.

References to be added.

Extensive Form Games with Perfect Information. Ideas of Perfection. "Paradox of Rationality".

FT, 3.

R. Rosenthal (1981), Games of Perfect Information, Predatory Pricing, and the Chain-Store Paradox, Journal of Economic Theory 25, 92--100.

P. Reny (1992), "Rationality in Extensive-Form Games." Journal of Economic Perspectives 6, 103--18.

Applications: Bargaining, Coalitions, War of Attrition.

A. Shaked and J. Sutton (1984), "Involuntary Unemployment as a Perfect Equilibrium in a Bargaining Model," Econometrica 52, 1351-1364.

FT, 4.6.

K. Chatterjee, B. Dutta, D. Ray and K. Sengupta (1993), "A Noncooperative Theory of Coalitional Bargaining," Review of Economic Studies 60, 463-477.

D. Ray and R. Vohra (1999), "A Theory of Endogenous Coalition Structure," Games and Economic Behavior 26, 286--336.

J. Bulow and P. Klemperer, "The Generalized War of Attrition," American Economic Review 89, 175-189.

Games with Incomplete Information. Return to Strategic Form. Harsanyi's Idea. Bayesian Nash Equilibrium. Applications and Examples. Auctions.

OR, 2.6.

FT, 6.

The Extensive Form with Incomplete Information. More Perfection Concepts: Sequential, Trembling-Hand, Proper... Applications. Forward Induction and Signaling. Applications.

FT, 8, 10-11.

OR, 11-12.

D. Kreps and R. Wilson (1982),"Reputation and Imperfect Information," Journal of Economic Theory 50, 253-79

I-K. Cho and D. Kreps (1987), "Signalling Games and Stable Equilibria," Quarterly Journal of Economics 102, 179-221.

V. Crawford and J. Sobel (1982), "Strategic Information Transmission," Econometrica 50, 1431-1451

More on Perturbations: Global Games

Carlsson and Van Damme (1993), "Global Games and Equilibrium Selection," Econometrica 61, 989-1018.

S. Morris and H. Shin (1998), "Unique Equilibrium in a Model of Self-Fulfilling Currency Attacks," American Economic Review 88, 587-597.

Repeated Games. Characterization of Perfect Equilibria. Applications. The Folk Theorem. Renegotiation.

D. Abreu (1988),“On the Theory of Infinitely Repeated Games with Discounting,” Econometrica 56, 383–96.

D. Abreu, P. Dutta and L. Smith (1994), "Folk Theorems for Repeated Games: A NEU Condition," Econometrica 62, 939-948

D. Fudenberg and E. Maskin (1986), "The Folk Theorem in Repeated Games with Discounting or with Incomplete Information," Econometrica 54, 533-556.

Infinite Horizon Games with State Variables. Markov Equilibrium.

FT, 13.1-13.2.

C. Harris and D. Laibson, "Hyperbolic Discounting and Consumption."

Harris

Bernheim-Ray

Large Populations. Random Matching. Applications. Evolutionary Stability.

(may not get this far)

M. Kandori (1992), "Social Norms and Community Enforcement," Review of Economic Studies 59, 61-80

M. Kandori, G. Mailath and R. Rob (1993), "Learning, Mutation and Long Run Equilibria in Games," Econometrica 61, 27-56

Coaltion Formation.

TBA (don't expect to get this far)

Miscellaneous Supplementary Readings

P. Klemperer (1999), "Auction Theory: A Guide to the Literature," Journal of Economic Surveys 13, 227-286.

R. Rosenthal and H. Landau (1979), "A Game-Theoretic Analysis of Bargaining with Reputations," Journal of Mathematical Psychology 20, 233-255. [Warning: large file, personal scan]