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April 30th:
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Our starting point in this course will be the paradoxes of material constitution. For example, suppose that I have just taken some clay and shape it into a statue of Elvis. Surely there is just one material object occupying the clay-filled space: a statue which is also a lump of clay. But surely the statue is something that only just came into existence, whereas the lump of clay has been in existence for a long time. So the statue and the lump of clay must be two different things, even though they occupy exactly the same space.
As we think about the various ways in which one might resolve paradoxes like this one, many other metaphysical questions will come up. We will embrace these opportunities for digression. As a result, by the end of the course, we will have considered a fair sampling of the traditional topics of metaphysics. These topics might include: questions about the existence and mind-independence of material objects; the nature of space and time; the possibility of time travel; the meaning of claims about possibility, necessity, and essence; the theory of composition; the existence and nature of properties and relations; the meaning of claims about causation and physical law; the freedom of the will; the criteria for, and significance of, personal identity.
Course Code: V83.0078-001
Instructor: Cian Dorr, 503H Main Building, office hours: Mondays at 3:00 PM or by appointment, email: cd50@nyu.edu.
TA: Brad Skow, 503M Main Building, office hours: Wednesdays at 3.00 PM or by appointment, email: bas236@nyu.edu.
Lecture Times: 11 - 12.15, Mondays and Wednesdays, Tisch LC4.
As indicated in the CAS Bulletin, this course is intended for students who have had some previous experience in philosophy. It will be presupposed that you already have some of the basic skills involved in analysing, evaluating and producing philosophical arguments. If you have never taken a philosophy class before, you might well find that things are going at too fast a pace, and that too much is being taken for granted. You should think seriously, while there is still time, about the possibility of switching into a more introductory philosophy course.
It is of essential importance that you should attend the lectures. A lot of important material that isn't discussed in the readings will be presented in the lectures. It is also important that you should on most occasions have done the required readings prior to the lecture for which they are assigned.
Instead of exams, there will be weekly problem sets and a final paper. A problem set will be handed out each Wednesday and due in class on the following Monday. 12 problem sets will be handed out in all; you must do 10 of them. No late problem sets will be accepted. You are encouraged to discuss the problem sets with fellow students; this is in fact a very good way to learn. However, if you do work with others, you must note this clearly, and you must put everything in your own words. The final paper will be due on May the 4th. It should be between 6 and 10 pages in length.
Your final grade will be determined as follows:
| 60% | 10 weekly problem sets. |
| 40% | Final paper. |
There are no compulsory textbooks for this course. A course packet containing those readings marked '(CP)' will be available from the University Copy Center on Waverly Place. The remaining readings will be distributed in class. Copies of the papers that are handed out will also be kept in a folder in the blue filing cabinet in the Philosophy Department library.
This is an extremely tentative syllabus that will certainly change considerably as the course goes on. Check this page frequently to keep up to date!
Every now and then, we will spend a session digressing from the main line of argument about the paradoxes of material consitution in order to discuss some other metaphysical question. These lectures have not been noted on the initial syllabus, since their timing and content will be heavily dependent on the speed with which we get through the basic material and on peoples' interests.
| Date | Topic and readings | Handouts |
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Jan 16 |
Introduction | |
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Jan 22 |
Arguments and Paradoxes | |
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Jan 24 |
The Paradoxes of Material Constitution (temporal versions) | |
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Jan 29 |
Two Responses Peter van Inwagen, 'The Doctrine of Arbitrary Undetached Parts' (sections 1-6) | |
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Jan 31 |
David Wiggins, 'On Being in the Same Place at the Same Time' | |
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Feb 5 |
… | |
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Feb 7 |
Spacetime | |
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Feb 12 |
Temporal Parts Ted Sider, Four-Dimensionalism, sections 1, 3.1, 3.2, 3.3. | |
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Feb 14 |
Time Travel David Lewis, 'The Paradoxes of Time Travel' (CP) Optional: Robert Heinlein, '—All You Zombies—' | |
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Feb 21 |
… | |
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Feb 26 |
Arguments for Temporal Parts David Lewis, Postscript B to 'Survival and Identity' (CP) Sider, Four-Dimensionalism, section 4.5. | |
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Feb 28 |
Lewis, On the Plurality of Worlds, pp. 202-204 (CP) Sider, Four-Dimensionalism, sections 4.6, 4.7. | |
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March 5 |
Arguments Against Temporal Parts Judith Jarvis Thomson, 'Parthood and Identity Across Time' (CP) | |
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March 7 |
Eternalism and Presentism Arthur Prior, 'Changes in Events and Changes in Things' | |
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March 19 |
Personal Identity | |
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March 21 |
Bernard Williams, 'The Self and the Future' (CP) | |
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March 26 |
Derek Parfit, 'Personal Identity' | |
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March 28 |
David Lewis, 'Survival as Identity' (CP) | |
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April 2 |
The Special Composition Question Peter van Inwagen, Material Beings, up to p. 74 (CP) | |
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April 4 |
Van Inwagen against Universalism Peter van Inwagen, Material Beings, sections 8 and 9 (CP) | |
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April 9 |
More on composition Peter van Inwagen, Material Beings, sections 10-13 (CP) | |
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April 11 |
Composition as a Fiction | |
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April 16 |
Modal versions of the paradoxes Peter van Inwagen, 'The Doctrine of Arbitrary Undetached Parts' (section 7) | |
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April 18 |
Ontological inflation Kit Fine, 'Acts, Events and Things' | |
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April 23 |
Modal Realism David Lewis, On the Plurality of Worlds, excerpts (CP) | |
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April 25 |
Equivocation and the Paradoxes David Lewis, On the Plurality of Worlds, excerpts (CP) Optional: Sider, Four-Dimensionalism, section 5.8 | |
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April 30 |
Concluding Remarks: Objectivity and Metaphysics |
For the moment, I'll just include links to three excellent pages maintained by Jim Pryor: a glossary of philosophical terms and methods, a set of guidelines on writing philosophy papers, and a set of guidelines on reading philosophy papers.