

Metaphysics: Problem set 8
March 28
due date: Wednesday, April 4

Don't write more than 2 pages total
NB: Use your own words. No quotation, no paraphrase.

1. Parfit claims (p. 205) that it is 'wildly inconsistent' to regard fission as death. Explain Parfit's reasons for this claim. Is he right (1 sentence)?
2. 'Identity must be part of what matters in survival. When we want survival, we want there to be someone in the future who has *memories* of the things that happen to us. But even if a person in the future who is not me has *apparent* memories that match my experiences, these will not be memories: rather, they will be misleading memory-hallucinations. So only my own continued existence can provide what matters.' Explain, on the basis of section 3 of 'Personal Identity', how Parfit would respond to this objection.
3. Lewis writes (p. 60): 'I claim that something is a continuant person if and only if it is a maximal R-interrelated aggregate of person-stages'. Explain.
4. According to Lewis, whenever there is a person who will later undergo fission, there are really two people who share a stage. One objection to this view is that it contradicts obvious facts about the number of people in various situations. For example, it seems to be a consequence of Lewis's account that it never happens that there is exactly one person in the waiting room of the duplication centre. (Suppose that once you have entered the waiting room there is no choice but to undergo fission.) Explain Lewis's response to this objection (p. 63ff.). Is the response convincing?
5. Would it make sense to choose to undergo fission, if you knew that one of the two resulting people would die a painful death soon after the fission, while the other one would live to achieve your heart's desire? How does the answer to this question bear on Lewis's account of what matters in survival? (You might want to refer in your answer to Postscript A of 'Survival and Identity')