New Research in Economic Theory

19 West 4th Street Room 624, Th 16.15-18.30 NYU 2025-26

Instructor: Debraj Ray

Here is a list of papers that we might be discussing through the year. It is expected that all of us will have read each paper in advance of the meeting in which that paper is to be discussed.

You are welcome to add papers in your area of interest, but clear them with the instructor first.

Second-year students taking the class for credit must submit a referee report on the paper a day in advance.

Journals you can use to find papers in:

Theoretical Economics

Econometrica

Journal of Economic Theory

Games and Economic Behavior

Some Papers (in no particular order):

1. Adda, Jérôme, and Marco Ottaviani. "Grantmaking, grading on a curve, and the paradox of relative evaluation in nonmarkets." The Quarterly Journal of Economics 139.2 (2024): 1255-1319.;

2. Auster, Sarah, Yeon-Koo Che, and Konrad Mierendorff. "Prolonged learning and hasty stopping: the Wald problem with ambiguity." American Economic Review 114.2 (2024): 426-461.;

3. Ball, Ian, and Jan Knoepfle. “Should the timing of inspections be predictable?” Working paper, 2024.;

4. Banerjee, Abhijit, and Olivier Compte. "Consensus and disagreement: Information aggregation under (not so) naive learning." Journal of Political Economy 132.8 (2024): 2790-2829.;

5. Bohren, J. Aislinn, et al. "Inaccurate statistical discrimination: An identification problem." Review of Economics and Statistics (2023): 1-45.;

6. Bohren, J. Aislinn, and Daniel N. Hauser. “Behavioral Foundations of Model Misspecification.” Working paper, 2024.;

7. Brooks, Benjamin, Alexander Frankel, and Emir Kamenica. "Information hierarchies." Econometrica 90.5 (2022): 2187-2214.;

8. Dewatripont, Mathias, and Jean Tirole. "The morality of markets." Journal of Political Economy 132.8 (2024): 2655-2694.;

9. Doval, Laura, and Alex Smolin. "Persuasion and welfare." Journal of Political Economy 132.7 (2024): 2451- 2487.;

10. Durandard, Theo. “Dynamic delegation in promotion contests.” Working paper, 2023.;

11. Echenique, Federico, and Teddy Mekonnen and M. Bumin Yenmez. “Diversity in choice as majorization.” Working paper, 2024.;

12. Frick, Mira, Ryota Iijima, and Yuhta Ishii. "Welfare comparisons for biased learning." American Economic Review 114.6 (2024): 1612-1649.;

13. Fudenberg, Drew, et al. "Measuring the completeness of economic models." Journal of Political Economy 130.4 (2022): 956-990.;

14. Mathevet, Laurent and Ina Taneva. “Organized information transmission.” Working paper, 2022.;

15. Gleyze, Simon and Agathe Pernoud. “The value of model misspecification in communication.” Working paper, 2024.;

16. Katzwinkel, Deniz, and Jan Knoepfle. "Costless information and costly verification: A case for transparency." Journal of Poli:cal Economy 131.2 (2023): 504-548.;

17. Kudinova, Evgeniya. “Exploration, exploitation, amelioration: Experimentation with endogenously changing arms.” Working paper, 2023.;

18. Liang, Annie, Jay Lu, and Xiaosheng Mu. "Algorithm design: A fairness-accuracy frontier." Working paper, 2024.;

19. Malladi, Suraj. “Searching in the dark and learning where to look.” Working paper, 2023.;

20. MonLel Olea, José Luis, et al. "Competing models." The Quarterly Journal of Economics 137.4 (2022): 2419- 2457.;

21. Sanjurjo, Adam. “Complexity in choice.” Working paper, 2023.;

22. Schumacher, Heiner, and Heidi Christina Thysen. "Equilibrium contracts and boundedly rational expectations." Theoretical Economics 17.1 (2022): 371-414.;

23. Ellis, Andrew, and Ran Spiegler. "Identifying assumptions and research dynamics." Working paper, 2024.;

24. Yang, Kai Hao, and Nathan Yoder, and Alexander Zentefis. “Explaining models.” Working paper, 2024.;

25. Zhu, John. “Interventions against machine-assisted statistical discrimination.” Working paper, 2024.

Some Older Papers We've Used in the Past:

Yeon-Koo Che and Konrad Mierendorff, Optimal Dynamic Allocation of Attention

Qingmin Liu, Konrad Mierendorff, Xianwen Shi, and Weijie Zhong, Auctions with Limited Commitment

Qingmin Liu, "Stability and Bayesian Consistency in Two-Sided Markets."

Matthew Elliott and Ben Golub, A Network Approach to Public Goods 

Matthew Elliott, Ben Golub and Matthew Jackson, Financial Networks and Contagion

Toomas Hinnosaar, Optimal Sequential Contests

Debraj Ray and Rajiv Vohra, "Games of Love and Hate"

Antony Millner, Nondogmatic Social Discounting

Annie Liang and Xiaosheng Mu, Complementary Information and Learning Traps

Annie Liang, Xiaosheng Mu and Vasilis Syrgkanis, Dynamically Aggregating Diverse Information

Mohammad Akbarpour, Piotr Dworczak and Scott Duke Kominers, Redistribution through Markets

Mohammad Akbarpour and Shengwu Li, Credible Mechanisms: A Trilemma

Elliot Lipnowski and Evan Sadler, Peer-Confirming Equilibrium

Elliot Lipnowski and Doron Ravid, Cheap Talk with Transparent Motives

Doron Ravid, Anne-Katrin Roesler and Balazs Szentes, Learning Before Trading: On the Inefficiency of Ignoring Free Information 

Nageeb Ali, Maximilian Mihm and Lucas Siga, Adverse Selection in Distributive Politics

Andrew McClellan, Experimentation and Approval Mechanisms

Daniel Clark, Drew Fudenberg and Alex Wolitsky: Steady-State Equilibria in Anonymous Repeated Games, I: Trigger Strategies in General Stage Games  and Steady-State Equilibria in Anonymous Repeated Games, II: Coordination-Proof Strategies in the Prisoner's Dilemma

Alex Wolitsky, Learning from Others' Outcomes

Dirk Bergemann, Benjamin Brooks, and Stephen Morris, "The Limits of Price Discrimination

Dirk Bergemann, Benjamin Brooks, and Stephen Morris, "Search, Information and Prices."

Erik Eyster, Shengwu Li, and Sarah Ridout, "A Theory of Ex-Post Rationalization."

T. Nguyen and R. Vohra, "Near-Feasible Stable Matchings with Couples."

Motty Perry and Phil Reny, "How to Count Citations if You Must."

A. Lizzeri and L. Yariv, "Collective Self-Control."

O Compte and P. Jehiel, "The Coalitional Nash Bargaining Solution."

D. Bergeman and J. Valimaki, "Bandit Problems." May be better for reading than for presenting as it's a survey.

Jon Eguia and Dimitrios Xefteris, "Implementation by Vote-Buying Mechanisms."

Rahul Deb, Mallesh Pai and Maher Said, "Evaluating Strategic Forecasters."

Aislinn Bohren, Alex Imas and Michael Rosemberg, "The Dynamics of Discrimination: Theory and Evidence.";

Nima Haghpanah, Elliot Lipnowski and Aditya Kuvalekar, "Selling to a Group.";

Avidit Acharya, Elliot Lipnowski and João Ramos, "Optimal Political Career Dynamics."

Paula Onuchic and Debraj Ray, "Signaling and Discrimination in Collaborative Projects."

Paula Onuchic and Joao Ramos, "Disclosure and Incentives in Teams."