Here is a list of papers that we might be discussing through the year. It is expected that all of us will have read each paper in advance of the meeting in which that paper is to be discussed.
You are welcome to add papers in your area of interest, but clear them with the instructor first.
Second-year students taking the class for credit must submit a referee report on the paper a day in advance.
Journals you can use to find papers in:
Some Papers:
Dirk Bergemann, Benjamin Brooks, and Stephen Morris, "The Limits of Price Discrimination."
Ilan Kremer, Yishay Mansour, and Motty Perry, "Implementing the Wisdom of the Crowd."
Motty Perry and Phil Reny, "How to Count Citations if You Must."
Jeff Ely, Alex Frankel and Emir Kamenica, "Surprise and Suspense."
Gabriel Carroll, "Robustness and Linear Contracts."
D. Abreu and Y. Sannikov, "An Algorithm for Two-Player Repeated Games with Perfect Monitoring"
Alexander Reffgen and Lars-Gunnar Svensson, "Strategy-proof voting for multiple public goods."
Jeff Ely, "Beeps."
Ran Spiegler, "Bayesian Networks and Boundedly Rational Expectations."
Debraj Ray and Ruqu Wang, "On Some Implications of Backward Discounting."
Debraj Ray and Rajiv Vohra, "The Farsighted Stable Set"
J. Steiner and J. Sakovicz, "Who Matters in Coordination Problems?"
D. Gerardi, J. Horner and L. Maestri, "The Role of Commitment in Bilateral Trade."
Mikhail Panov, "A Theory of 'Interspection' in Games."
A. Lizzeri and L. Yariv, "Collective Self-Control."
Marina Halac and Pierre Yared, "Fiscal Rules and Discretion in a World Economy."
S. Morris and H. Shin, "Contagious Adverse Selection."
A. Gershkov and M. Perry, "Dynamic Contracts with Moral Hazard and Adverse Selection."
O Compte and P. Jehiel, "The Coalitional Nash Bargaining Solution."
D. Bergeman and J. Valimaki, "Bandit Problems."
M. Halac, "Relational Contracts and the Value of Relationships."
M. Halac, N. Kartik, and Q.Liu, "Optimal Contracts for Experimentation."
N. Kartik, F. Squintani and K. Tinn, "Information Revelation and Pandering in Elections."
Y. Sannikov, "A Continuous-Time Version of the Principal-Agent Problem.”
A. Frankel, "Aligned Delegation."
M. Jackson and L. Yariv, "Collective Dynamic Choice: The Necessity of Time Inconsistency."
More papers to be added...