

Objectivity: Syllabus

Cian Dorr

September 12, 2001

In many different areas of philosophy, from ethics and aesthetics to the philosophy of science and mathematics, one keeps finding that the most fundamental debate is a debate about the objectivity of our thought and talk about the subject matter in question. When things go well with our inquiries, are we discovering a realm of genuine, objective facts? Or is there nothing more to the subject-matter than what we ourselves construct or constitute by our thoughts and practices—the whole thing just a projection onto reality of idiosyncratic features of our own subjective perspective?

These questions are very obscure. In this course, we will be considering a collection of much less obscure things which one might want to say about a subject matter which might reasonably be taken as capturing a sense in which the subject-matter is or is not objective. The positions we will concentrate on are often brushed aside in the contemporary literature on objectivity and realism as overly simplistic: philosophers have worked hard trying to pin down some elusive question about objectivity which allegedly remains even when we have rejected all the more straightforward forms of anti-objectivism that we will be considering. Some of the attempts to articulate this further question I find unintelligible (e.g. Fine, 2001; Dummett, 1959), except to the extent that I can see how they might be translated into one of the questions we will consider in the course. Others (e.g. Wright, 1992) I think I understand well enough, but I don't see how the questions described answer to the concerns that motivate our initial interest in objectivity. But that's neither here nor there: I hope I can at least demonstrate that there's plenty of interest in the questions we *will* consider.

As I see it, ways of understanding the question 'is it objectively the case that p ?' fall into two different clusters.

(i) One cluster of notions is *symmetric*. In this sense, if I say that it's not objectively the case that p , it follows that it's also not objectively the case that not- p —it's not objective *whether* p . Disputes about whether p are in some sense not *genuine* disputes: in some sense, those who maintain that p are 'on a par'

with those who maintain that not- p . To say that a subject matter or "discourse", such as ethics or mathematics, is not objective in this sense is to say that certain salient, intractable disputes we have over ethical or mathematical questions—e.g. disputes about whether abortion is wrong, or about the truth of the continuum hypothesis—are not objective disputes.

(ii) There's another cluster of notions that isn't symmetric in this way. If someone says 'wrongness is just a human construction' or 'numbers don't have objective existence' or something like that, they probably don't intend to suggest that the dispute between two people one of whom says 'there are numbers/some actions are wrong' and the other of whom says 'there aren't any numbers/no actions are wrong' is in any sense not a genuine dispute. They might well say something confusing along these lines: *from an objective point of view*, there are no numbers/wrong actions—a person who says that there are no numbers or wrong actions is objectively correct; the opponent who says that there are numbers/wrong actions has a merely "subjective" sort of correctness. Or they might happily say that since there are numbers (albeit they are human constructions), anyone who maintains that there are no numbers is mistaken. Or they might instead say that there are no numbers, so that one who says there are numbers is speaking falsely. To say that a subject matter (like ethics or mathematics) is not objective in this sense would be to say that certain fundamental claims that are generally held beyond dispute are not objective claims.

These two ways of denying the objectivity of a discourse seem to be independent. Someone could maintain that it's in every sense an objective fact that killing babies for fun is wrong, while denying that actual ethical disputes, e.g. over the permissibility of abortion, are objective. Contrariwise, someone could maintain that even though mathematics is "a mere construct", mathematical disputes are all perfectly objective, considered as questions about the nature of the construct: somehow our constructive activity has made the continuum hypothesis true or false, despite the fact that it isn't provable from the axioms we have generally adopted. On the other hand, there

are clearly tendencies for anti-objectivism of one sort to lead to anti-objectivism of the other sort. This is clear in the mathematical case. If you think that the realm of mathematical entities is constructed by our practices, it would be very natural for you to think that questions about that realm that can't be resolved using generally-accepted methods are non-objective. Conversely, if you think that the realm of mathematical entities has a fully objective existence, it's hard to see how certain disputed questions, e.g. about how many mathematical entities of certain sorts there are, could fail to have objectively right answers (Balaguer, 1995, 1998, but it's not impossible: see).

In part 2 of the course, we will consider four different interpretations of a symmetric notion of non-objectivity. First, there is what I will call "standard relativism": people who apparently disagree—say, about whether abortion is permissible—really mean different things by their words, and thus are "talking past each other"; both could be right. Second, there is "hidden indexical relativism": even though both parties mean the same thing, the disagreement still is only apparent; both could be right, since the meaning the parties share is indexical or context-dependent in some non-obvious way, and the different parties are in different contexts. Third, there is *indeterminacy*: 'abortion is permissible', just like certain sentences of the form ' x is bald', is neither determinately true nor determinately false. Fourth, there is *expressivism*: sentences like 'abortion is permissible' do not express *beliefs*, but attitudes of some other sort; thus our "disagreement" when we argue about whether abortion is permissible is no more than a clash of attitude.

In part 3 of the course we will consider the question to what extent typical disputes in *metaphysics* lack objectivity in one of these senses.

But before we get to any of this, in part 1 of the course, we will consider a family of interpretations of a non-symmetric notion of objectivity. On these interpretations, to say that it is not objectively the case that p is just to say that it is not the case that p —or better, that *in some strict sense* it is not the case that p . Thus, mathematics will be 'non-objective' if, e.g., there are no numbers, strictly speaking. The notion of 'strictly speaking' is important here, since most people who say things like 'there are no numbers' when they are doing philosophy will want on other

occasions to say things like 'there are numbers'—or 'there are prime numbers between 2 and 12'—and thus need to distinguish the speech act they are performing when they say 'there are no numbers' while doing philosophy from the speech act they would have performed had they said 'there are no numbers' on one of these other occasions. Anti-objectivisms of this sort differ as regards how they conceive of the distinction between 'strict' and 'loose' speaking.

Explanation of the syllabus

Readings marked '*' will definitely be discussed in class. Readings marked '+' will probably be discussed in class. Readings marked '—' will probably not be discussed in class. I reserve the right to change my mind about this.

1 Objectivity as strict and literal truth

(i) Ontology and Reduction

For much of this century, surprising claims of the form 'there are no F s' went hand-in-hand with claims of the form ' F s are logical constructions out of non- F s'. We will consider how to make sense of this way of talking.

- * Alston 1963
- + Russell 1924
- + Quine 1948
- van Inwagen 1998

(ii) Van Fraassen's Constructive Empiricism

- * van Fraassen 1980, chapter 1
- + Rosen 1994b is a very good piece on the interpretation of van Fraassen, which also raises some interesting difficulties for the position. van Fraassen (1994) responds.
- This is as good a time as any to mention Dorr and Rosen 2001, which advocates 'revolutionary' fictionalism with regard to talk about composite material objects.

(iii) Field's fictionalism about mathematical entities

- * Field 1989a
- Field's view is also presented in Field 1980 and in many of the other papers in Field 1989b.

- The literature on the question whether there are any mathematical entities is vast. Burgess and Rosen (1997, chapter 1) might be a good place to start.

(iv) Yablo on fictionalism and make-believe

- * Yablo 2000
- Like several other contemporary fictionalists (Crimmins (1998) is another good example), Yablo is heavily influenced by Kendall Walton’s (1990) account of fiction in terms of make-believe. Parts I and IV are especially relevant to non-aestheticians.
- Yablo develops his view of mathematics in more detail in Yablo MS. This paper is also more explicit in its rejection of Field’s claim that a nominalist must show how to formulate scientific theories without using mathematical vocabulary.

Further readings for this part of the course

- One current debate which shows the structure of arguments about realism in a clear way is the debate about the question whether any physical objects are coloured. Boghossian and Velleman (1989) argue that they are not. Johnston (1992) agrees that *in a very strict sense* they are not, but claims that in a more ordinary sense there are.
- Mackie (1977, chapter 1) is the source for the phrase ‘error theory’. According to philosophical folklore, Mackie holds that strictly speaking, nothing is right or wrong, good or bad. But this claim isn’t exactly on the surface of Mackie’s text. I find Burgess’s (MS) expression of the ‘anethicist’ view much clearer; however, Burgess’s view belongs more naturally in the second part of the course. On the question whether it would be a good idea to scrap moral discourse, see Hinckfuss 1987. Lewis (1989) holds that in an exceptionally strict sense, nothing is a value.
- The most extreme anti-realism I know of is Unger’s (1979b; 1979a) claim that there are no ‘ordinary objects’ like chairs, plants, and people. If Unger’s argument were sound, it would not merely follow that there are no chairs: it would follow that *in no sense* are there any chairs, and that the sentence ‘there are chairs’ can *in no sense* be correctly asserted; moreover, this would

remain true on any humanly feasible revision of our linguistic practices.

- Rosen (1990) recommends a fictionalist attitude towards talk of *possible worlds*. There is an instructive sequence of objections and replies to this paper: see especially Rosen 1993, Noonan 1994 and Nolan and Hawthorne 1996.
- I have defended fictionalism with regard to complex objects and properties. Those who are interested can look at my Ph.D. dissertation, which I will put up on my website as soon as I get a chance. N.B. I am not recommending that anyone should actually look at this this!
- Two neglected historical sources for fictionalism: Bentham 1932 and Vaihinger 1924. It would be great if someone would write a paper about one of these guys.
- Johnston (1993) proposes an entirely different interpretation of a non-symmetric notion of objectivity in terms of the notion of *response-dependence*: talk about the colour of an object, for example, is really about the disposition of the object to affect human beings in certain ways; this is supposed to capture a sense in which colour-talk is not entirely objective. (See also Wright 1992, chapter ?.) Rosen (1994a) objects that the view that a body of claims is response-dependent doesn’t seem to do anything to vindicate anti-realist imagery, in the absence of some reason to think that talk about human beings and their responses is less than fully objective. I agree, with one caveat: response-dependent analyses often contain indexical terms (e.g. Lewis’s (1989) claim that something is a value iff “we” are disposed to value it under conditions of ideal imaginative acquaintance), so that these analyses will tend to lead to hidden-indexical relativism.

2 Non-objective questions

(i) Relativism and Indeterminacy

- * Harman 1975
- * Burgess MS

(ii) Expressivism

- Ayer’s statement of emotivism (1936, pp. 102–114) is hard to beat.

- The so-called “Frege-Geach” problem is presented in Geach 1965.
- Simon Blackburn states his influential ‘quasi-realist’ version of expressivism about ethics, and attempts to solve the Frege-Geach problem, in Blackburn 1984, chapter 6. Hale (1993) and Schueler (1988) claim that Blackburn fails to solve the problem; Blackburn’s response (1988) brings his theory close to that of Gibbard. The most up-to-date expression of Blackburn’s general view of ethics (with hardly a mention of the Frege-Geach problem) is in Blackburn 1999.
- * Gibbard 1990
- + Dorr MS gives an argument against expressivism (more precisely, non-cognitivism) which is really quite distinct from the Frege-Geach problem, although people keep thinking otherwise.

(iii) **Objectivity and the theory of truth** Are currently popular ‘deflationary’ and ‘minimalist’ theories of truth compatible with indeterminacy and expressivism?

- The claim that expressivism (or at least, expressivism as usually formulated) is incompatible with a sufficiently “minimal” theory of truth is made by Boghossian (1990), Wright (1992, chapters 1 and 2) and Horwich (1993).
- * Field 1994 defends the view that one can be an expressivist (‘non-factualist’) about a sentence even while granting that it is *true*.
- Smith (1994b) defends the view that expressivism about a discourse (construed as entailing that sentences about that discourse are never true) is consistent with something called ‘minimalism about truth’. This paper sparked several responses: Divers and Miller 1994, Horwich 1994, Smith 1994a, Frank Jackson and Smith 1994, Hawthorne and Price 1996.

Further readings for this part of the course

- Searle (1970) presents a general approach to the classification of speech acts to which one might want to appeal to make more precise sense of the claim that certain sentences ‘express’ non-cognitive states.

- The most widely-discussed expressivist theories concern normativity and value. But expressivism has been defended in other areas as well. Edgington (1986) advocates expressivism about *conditionals*. Field (2001) advocates something like expressivism about semantic notions like translation, meaning, reference and truth. Wittgenstein is often interpreted as advocating a very wide-ranging expressivism.
- The question what it means to say that a sentence is indeterminate in truth-value—or, staying at the object level, that it is indeterminate whether ϕ —is a very difficult one, far too large for us to consider in any depth. A good place to start might be Williamson 1994, which ends up advocating a position that most of us interpret as the denial that there can be any such thing as indeterminacy.

3 The objectivity of metaphysical questions

(i) **Carnap: ‘Empiricism, Semantics and Ontology’**

- * Carnap 1950
- Yablo 1998 is a recent attempt to make sympathetic sense of Carnap.

(ii) **Putnam: ‘Models and Reality’**

- * Putnam 1980
- Other sources for Putnam’s view: Putnam 1977; Putnam 1981, chapter 2.
- Putnam’s argument is anticipated in M. H. A. Newman’s (1928) criticism of Russell’s (1927) “structural realist” theory of our knowledge of the external world.
- We won’t be reading Kripke 1982 in class, but there is some similarity between Kripke’s argument and Putnam’s. The large exegetical literature on Kripkenstein also might be useful.
- Field MS is partly devoted to questions about the interpretation of Putnam.

(iii) **Lewis’s response to Putnam**

- * Lewis 1984
- The notion of naturalness that features in Lewis’s response to Putnam is discussed more fully in Lewis 1983.

- + Horwich (1998) shows how the general idea underlying Lewis's response to Putnam can be preserved by someone (not me!) who was suspicious of Lewis's heavy-duty metaphysics.
 - Sider 2001 argues, assuming Lewis's semantic framework, that there is no fact of the matter about personal identity in puzzle cases.
- (iv) The objectivity of existential quantification**
- * Putnam 1987
 - van Inwagen forthcoming
 - + Sider 2002, introduction
 - Field MS, especially section 7
- (v) More on the objectivity of logical notions**
- * McGee 2000
 - * Field 1998b
 - Field 1998a is an accessible introduction to the issue of the objectivity of mathematical discourse. Field 1998c is a more advanced piece.

References

- Alston, William (1963). 'Ontological Commitments.' *Philosophical Studies* 14: 1–8. Reprinted in Laurence and Macdonald 1998: 46–54.
- Ayer, Alfred Jules (1936). *Language, Truth and Logic*. London: Victor Gollancz Ltd., 1946. Second edition.
- Balaguer, Mark (1995). 'A Platonist Epistemology.' *Synthese* 103: 303–325.
- (1998). *Platonism and Anti-Platonism in Mathematics*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Bentham, Jeremy (1932). *Bentham's Theory of Fictions*. Ed. C. K. Ogden. New York: Harcourt.
- Blackburn, Simon (1984). *Spreading The Word*. Oxford: Clarendon.
- (1988). 'Attitudes and Contents.' *Ethics* ??? : ? Reprinted in Blackburn 1993: ???
- (1993). *Essays in Quasi-Realism*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- (1999). *Ruling Passions*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Boghossian, Paul (1990). 'The Status of Content.' *The Philosophical Review* 99: 157–184.
- Boghossian, Paul and J. David Velleman (1989). 'Colour as a Secondary Quality.' *Mind* 98: 81–103.
- Burgess, John (MS). 'Against Ethics.' Unpublished manuscript, written shortly after ???
- Burgess, John P. and Gideon Rosen (1997). *A Subject with No Object: Strategies for Nominalistic Interpretation of Mathematics*. Oxford: Clarendon.
- Carnap, Rudolf (1947). *Meaning and Necessity: A Study in Semantics and Modal Logic*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
- (1950). 'Empiricism, Semantics and Ontology.' *Revue Internationale de Philosophie* 4: 20–40. Reprinted in Carnap 1947: 205–221.
- Crimmins, Mark (1998). 'Hesperus and Phosphorus: Sense, Pretense, and Reference.' *The Philosophical Review* 107: 1–47.

- Divers, John and Alexander Miller (1994). ‘Why Expressivists about Value Should Not Love Minimalism about Truth.’ *Analysis* 54: 12–19.
- Dorr, Cian (MS). ‘Non-cognitivism and Wishful Thinking.’ Forthcoming in *Noûs*.
- Dorr, Cian and Gideon Rosen (2001). ‘Composition as a Fiction.’ Forthcoming in the *Blackwell Companion to Metaphysics*, ed. Richard Grandy.
- Dummett, Michael (1959). ‘Truth.’ *Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society* 59: 141–162. Reprinted in Dummett 1978: 1–24.
- (1978). *Truth and Other Enigmas*. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press.
- Edgington, Dorothy (1986). ‘Do Conditionals Have Truth-Values?’ *Critica* 18: 3–30.
- Field, Hartry (1980). *Science Without Numbers*. Oxford: Blackwell.
- (1989a). ‘Introduction: Fictionalism, Epistemology and Modality.’ In Field (1989b), 1–52.
- (1989b). *Realism, Mathematics and Modality*. Oxford: Blackwell.
- (1994). ‘Disquotational Truth and Factually Defective Discourse.’ *The Philosophical Review* 103: 405–52. Reprinted in Field 2001: 222–258.
- (1998a). ‘Mathematical Objectivity and Mathematical Objects.’ In Laurence and Macdonald (1998), 387–403. Reprinted in Field 2001: 315–332.
- (1998b). ‘Some Thoughts on Radical Indeterminacy.’ *The Monist* 81: 253–273. Reprinted in Field 2001: 259–277.
- (1998c). ‘Which Undecidable Mathematical Sentences Have Determinate Truth Values?’ In H. Garth Dales and Gianluigi Oliveri (eds.), *Truth in Mathematics*, 291–310. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Reprinted in Field 2001: 332–360.
- (2001). *Truth and the Absence of Fact*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- (MS). ‘Mathematical Undecidables, Metaphysical Realism, and Equivalent Descriptions.’ Forthcoming in Schilpp volume on Putnam.
- Fine, Kit (2001). ‘The Question of Realism.’ *Philosopher’s Imprint* 1: ?
- Frank Jackson, Graham Oppy and Michael Smith (1994). ‘Minimalism and Truth Aptness.’ *Mind* 103: 287–302.
- Geach, Peter (1965). ‘Assertion.’ *The Philosophical Review* 74: 449–465.
- Gibbard, Allan (1990). *Wise Choices, Apt Feelings*. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press.
- Hale, Bob (1993). ‘Can There Be a Logic of Attitudes?’ In Wright and Haldane (1993), 337–363.
- Harman, Gilbert (1975). ‘Moral Relativism Defended.’ *The Philosophical Review* 84: 3–22.
- Hawthorne, John [O’Leary-] and Huw Price (1996). ‘How to Stand Up for Non-cognitivists.’ *Australasian Journal of Philosophy* 74: 275–292.
- Hinckfuss, Ian (1987). ‘The Moral Society: Its Structure and Effects.’ Available online at <http://www.uq.edu.au/philosophy/morsoc/>.
- Horwich, Paul (1993). ‘Gibbard’s Theory of Norms.’ *Philosophy and Public Affairs* 22: 67–78.
- (1994). ‘The Essence of Expressivism.’ *Analysis* 54: 19–20.
- (1998). *Meaning*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Johnston, Mark (1992). ‘How To Speak Of The Colours.’ *Philosophical Studies* 68: 221–263.
- (1993). ‘Objectivity Refigured: Pragmatism and Modern Idealism.’ In Wright and Haldane (1993), 85–130.
- Kripke, Saul (1982). *Wittgenstein on Rules and Private Language*. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press.
- Laurence, Stephen and Cynthia Macdonald (eds.) (1998). *Contemporary Readings in the Foundations of Metaphysics*. Oxford: Blackwell.

- Lewis, David (1983). ‘New Work for a Theory of Universals.’ *Australasian Journal of Philosophy* 61: 343–377. Reprinted in Lewis 1999: 8–55.
- (1984). ‘Putnam’s Paradox.’ *Australasian Journal of Philosophy* 62: 221–236. Reprinted in Lewis 1999: 56–77.
- (1989). ‘Dispositional Theories of Value.’ *Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society* Supp. 63: 113–137. Reprinted in Lewis 2000: 68–94.
- (1999). *Papers in Metaphysics and Epistemology*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- (2000). *Papers in Ethics and Social Philosophy*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Mackie, J. L. (1977). *Ethics: Inventing Right and Wrong*. London: Penguin.
- McGee, Vann (2000). ‘Everything.’ In Gila Sher and Richard Tieszen (eds.), *Between Logic and Intuition: Essays in Honor of Charles Parsons*, 54–78. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Newman, M. H. A. (1928). ‘Mr. Russell’s “Causal Theory of Perception”.’ *Mind* 37: 137–148.
- Nolan, Daniel and John [O’Leary-] Hawthorne (1996). ‘Reflexive Fictionalisms.’ *Analysis* 56: 23–32.
- Noonan, Harold W. (1994). ‘In Defence of the Letter of Fictionalism.’ *Analysis* 54: 133–139.
- Putnam, Hilary (1977). ‘Realism and Reason.’ *Proceedings of the American Philosophical Association* 50: 483–498. Reprinted in Putnam 1978: ???
- (1978). *Meaning and the Moral Sciences*. Boston: Routledge and Kegan Paul.
- (1980). ‘Models and Reality.’ *Journal of Symbolic Logic* 45: 464–482. Reprinted in Putnam 1983: 1–25.
- (1981). *Reason, Truth and History*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- (1983). *Realism and Reason: Philosophical Papers, volume 3*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- (1987). ‘Truth and Convention: On Davidson’s Refutation of Conceptual Relativism.’ *Dialectica* 41: 41–67. Reprinted in Putnam 1990: 96–104.
- (1990). *Realism with a Human Face*. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press.
- Quine, Willard van Orman (1948). ‘On What There Is.’ *Review of Metaphysics* 2: 21–38. Reprinted in Quine 1953: 1–19.
- (1953). *From a Logical Point of View*. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press.
- Rosen, Gideon (1990). ‘Modal Fictionalism.’ *Mind* 99: 327–354.
- (1993). ‘A Problem for Fictionalism for Possible Worlds.’ *Analysis* 53: 71–81.
- (1994a). ‘Objectivity and Modern Idealism: What Is The Question?’ In Michaelis Michael and John O’Leary-Hawthorne (eds.), *Philosophy In Mind: The Place of Philosophy in the Study of Mind, ?* Dordrecht: Kluwer.
- (1994b). ‘What Is Constructive Empiricism?’ *Philosophical Studies* 74: 143–178.
- Russell, Bertrand (1924). ‘Logical Atomism.’ In David F. Pears (ed.), *The Philosophy of Logical Atomism*, 157–181. La Salle, Illinois: Open Court, 1985.
- (1927). *The Analysis of Matter*. London: Routledge, 1992.
- Schueler, G. F. (1988). ‘Modus Ponens and Moral Realism.’ *Ethics* 501–517.
- Searle, John (1970). *Speech Acts*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Sider, Theodore (2001). ‘Criteria of Personal Identity and the Limits of Conceptual Analysis.’ In James Tomberlin (ed.), *Philosophical Perspectives 15: Metaphysics, ?* Cambridge, Mass.: Blackwell.
- (2002). *Four-Dimensionalism: An Ontology of Persistence and Time*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Smith, Michael (1994a). ‘Minimalism, Truth-aptness and Belief.’ *Analysis* 54: 21–26.

- (1994b). ‘Why Expressivists about Value should Love Minimalism about Truth.’ *Analysis* 54: 1–12.
- Unger, Peter (1979a). ‘I Do Not Exist.’ In G. F. Macdonald (ed.), *Perception and Identity*, ? London: The MacMillan Press.
- (1979b). ‘There Are No Ordinary Objects.’ *Synthese* 41: 117–154.
- Vaihinger, Hans (1924). *The Philosophy of ‘As If’: a System of the Theoretical, Practical and Religious Fictions of Mankind*. London: Routledge. Translated by C. K. Ogden.
- van Fraassen, Bas (1980). *The Scientific Image*. Oxford: Clarendon Press.
- (1994). ‘Gideon Rosen on Constructive Empiricism.’ *Philosophical Studies* 74: 179–192.
- van Inwagen, Peter (1998). ‘The Nature of Metaphysics?’ In Laurence and Macdonald (1998), 11–21.
- (forthcoming). ‘The Number of Things.’ In Ernest Sosa (ed.), *Philosophical Issues, volume 12: Realism and Relativism*. Oxford: Blackwell.
- Walton, Kendall (1990). *Mimesis as Make-Believe*. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press.
- Williamson, Timothy (1994). *Vagueness*. London: Routledge.
- Wright, Crispin (1992). *Truth and Objectivity*. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press.
- Wright, Crispin and John Haldane (eds.) (1993). *Reality, Representation and Projection*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Yablo, Stephen (1998). ‘Does Ontology Rest on a Mistake?’ *Aristotelian Society Supp.* 72: 229–261.
- (2000). ‘A Paradox of Existence.’ In Anthony Everett and Thomas Hofweber (eds.), *Empty Names, Fiction and the Puzzles of Non-Existence*, 275–312. Stanford: CSLI Press.
- (MS). ‘Mathematics as Gamekeeping.’ Available online at <http://www.mit.edu/~yablo/mgk.html>.