

Questions about *Treatise* I.iii.vii–I.iii.xvi

1. What is the main alternative Hume sees to the theory of belief presented in I.iii.vii, and how does he argue against it?
2. Read the introduction to the *Appendix* to the *Treatise*, pp. 623–627, and note the additions to Part III of Book I on pp. 628–633. Also read *Enquiry* 5.2. What are the most important differences between Hume's treatment of belief in these three places?
3. A famous quotation: 'Thus all probable reasoning is nothing but a species of sensation. 'Tis not solely in poetry and music, we must follow our taste and sentiment, but likewise in philosophy.' (p. 103) What is Hume saying here, and why does he say it?
4. "'Tis certain, that not only in philosophy, but even in common life, we may attain the knowledge of a particular cause merely by one experiment, provided it be made with judgment. . . .' (p. 104) What is the objection to his theory which Hume is considering here, and what is his response?
5. What does Hume mean by 'education' (p. 116 ff.)?
6. (I don't have any specific questions about it; but if someone wanted to outline the main points of the very interesting theory of probability Hume presents in sections xi–xiii, that would be a great topic for a presentation.)

On to *Treatise* I.iii.iv (some of these questions are very hard!). . .

7. What objection is Hume considering in the passage from the *Appendix* on pp. 632–633, and how does he respond to it? Is the response successful?
8. What, according to Hume (p. 161), is 'the true manner of conceiving a particular power in a particular body'? Why does he think this is impossible? How do these remarks fit with Hume's claim that we do have an idea of power?
9. Hume says that the idea of necessary connection is copied from a certain impression, and that that impression has something to do with the 'determination' (or 'propensity') of the mind to form beliefs in a certain way. What is the relation between the 'determination' and the 'impression' supposed to be (see especially p. 165)? Sometimes Hume seems to say that the impression *is* the determination: does this even make sense? How can an impression *be* the 'determination of the mind' to do a certain thing? If the relation isn't identity, what else could it be?
10. What error is Hume explaining on p. 167 (first full paragraph)? How does the explanation work? Why is he so confident that the error really is an error?

11. On p. 170, Hume notoriously gives two different definitions of 'cause'. Are the two definitions equivalent? If not, how can he consistently mean both of them to be taken at face value?
12. How should we understand the second definition? Does it follow from it that objects which no-one knows about cannot be causes? Why/why not?
13. What status does Hume claim for the 'general rules' presented in I.iii.xv? Why should we reason in accordance with these rules, rather than in some other way?