# **EC9AA Term 3: Lectures on Economic Inequality**

Debraj Ray, University of Warwick, Summer 2024

Slides 4: Measuring Upward Mobility

## Introduction

Mobility centrally important in current debates:

In the United States and Europe

Chetty et al (2017), Alesina et al (2018), Manduca et al (2020)

Connection to growth, inequality, aspirations etc.

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- The concept refers to:
- the ease of transition between various social categories;
- income, wealth, location, political persuasions ...

Pure movement: off-diagonals in transition matrix. Atkinson (1981), Bartholomew (1982), Conlisk (1974), Dardanoni (1993), Hart (1976), Prais (1955), Shorrocks (1978a,b) ...

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■ Movement up ≻ movement down; Chakravarty et al. (1985), Bénabou and Ok (2001), Chetty et al. (2014), Bhattacharya (2011), Fields and Ok (1996, 1999), Mitra and Ok (1998)...

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#### + all combinations of these ...

# A Large But Still Incomplete List

Name	Measure	Directional	Non-directional	Absolute	Relative
King (1983)	$M_{\kappa} = 1 - \exp \left[-\frac{\gamma}{n} \sum \frac{ z_i - y_i }{\mu_y}\right]$		✓		√
Shorrocks index (1978)	$M_S = \frac{n - \text{Tr}(P)}{n - 1}$		√		√
Variability of the eigenvalues	$\sigma(\gamma_i)$		$\checkmark$		√
Bartholomew (1982)	$M_B = \frac{1}{n-1} \sum_i \sum_j \pi_i p_{ij} \mid i - j \mid$		✓		√
IG Income Elasticity (IGE)	$\beta = \frac{Cov(S_{it}, S_{it-1})}{Var(S_{it-1})}$		1	✓	
Correlation coefficient (CE)	$\rho_S = \frac{\operatorname{Cov}(S_{it}, S_{it-1})}{\sqrt{\operatorname{Var}(S_{it})}\sqrt{\operatorname{Var}(S_{it-1})}}$		√	✓	
Slope rank-rank	$\rho_{PR} = \operatorname{Corr}(P_i, R_i)$		$\checkmark$		√
IG rank association (IRA)	$\beta = \frac{\operatorname{Cov}(p_{it}^{w}, p_{it}^{X})}{\operatorname{Var}(p_{it}^{X})}$		√		√
Mitra & Ok (1998)	$MO_{\alpha}(\mathbf{x}, \mathbf{y}) = \frac{1}{n} \gamma \left( \sum_{i}  y_{i} - x_{i} ^{\alpha} \right)^{1/\alpha}$		√	√	
Gini symmetric index of mobility	$GS = \frac{\sum_{i}(y_{i}-x_{i})(F_{xi}-F_{yi})}{\sum_{i}(y_{i}-1)F_{yi}+\sum_{i}(x_{i}-1)F_{xi}}$		✓	√	
Great Gatsby curve	Corr(Gini, IGE)		√	√	
Bhattacharya (2011)	$\nu = \Pr(F_1(Y_1) - F_0(Y_0) > \tau   s_1 \le F_0(Y_0) \le s_2, X = x)$	$\checkmark$			√
Absolute upward mobility (1)	$p_{25} = \mathbb{E}(Y X \le 25)$	$\checkmark$			√
Absolute upward mobility (2)	$A = \Phi\left(\frac{\mu_c - \mu_p}{\sqrt{\sigma_p^2 + \sigma_c^2 + 2\rho\sigma_p\sigma_c}}\right)$	~			√
Chetty et al (2017)	$AM(\mathbf{x},\mathbf{y}) = rac{1}{n}\sum_i (1_{y_i] \geq x_i})$	$\checkmark$		√	
Rising up-up	$P_{20to100} = \mathbb{E}[Y = 100 X = 20]$	√			√
Bottom half mobility	$\mu_0^{50} = \mathbb{E}(y x \in [0, 50])$	$\checkmark$			√
Fields & Ok (1999)	$FO(\mathbf{x}, \mathbf{y}) = \frac{1}{n} \sum_{i} (\ln(y_i) - \ln(x_i))$	✓		✓	
Card (2018)	$\mathbb{E}(y > 50   x \in [45, 70])$	$\checkmark$		✓	
Pro-poor growth	$G = \sum_{k=1}^{5} w_k g_k$	~		<ul> <li>✓</li> </ul>	

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### Data demands

- Existing measures rely heavily on panel data (more discussion later).
- This has held back empirical work, especially on developing countries.

- We propose a measure of **upward mobility** that is:
- Directional: rewards growth and punishes decline;
- at least for absolute measures (more on relative measures later).

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- An "instantaneous" measure or **upward mobility kernel** that is: intermediate step
- directional and progressive.
- A mobility measure on trajectories that is: what we're after
- based on the collection of instantaneous kernels.

## **Instantaneous Upward Mobility**

- **Central variable**: *y*, "income."
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- **Central variable**: *y*, "income."
- state variable for individual well-being.
- e.g., "permanent income" or a proxy, such as consumption
- Data: For each person:
- $y_i > 0$  baseline income
- $g_i = \dot{y_i} / y_i$  instantaneous growth rate.
- $\mathbf{z} =$ the full collection  $\{z_i\}_{i=1}^n$ , where  $z_i = (y_i, g_i)$ .

Upward mobility kernel:  $M(\mathbf{z})$ , where  $\mathbf{z} = \{z_i\}_{i=1}^n$ , and  $z_i = (y_i, g_i)$ .

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- Anonymous, continuous.
- Zero-growth normalization:

 $g_i = 0$  all  $i \mapsto M(\mathbf{z}) = 0$ .

Consistency under population mergers.

Details

## **Core Axiom**

### Examples:

- $\mathbf{y} = (5000, 10000) + \mathbf{g} = (8\%, 8\%) \succ \mathbf{y} = (5000, 10000) + \mathbf{g} = (6\%, 10\%).$
- $\mathbf{y} = (5000, 10000) + \mathbf{g} = (2\%, -2\%) \succ \mathbf{y} = (5000, 10000) + \mathbf{g} = (0\%, 0\%).$
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- No crossings in continuous time.
- Growth Progressivity.
- For any z, *i* and *j* with  $y_i < y_j$ , and  $\epsilon > 0$ , send  $g_i$  to  $g_i + \epsilon$  and  $g_j$  to  $g_j \epsilon$ .
- $\label{eq:constraint} \quad \text{Then } M(\mathbf{z}') > M(\mathbf{z}).$

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- $\label{eq:main_state} \quad \text{Then } M(\mathbf{z}') > M(\mathbf{z}).$
- Notes:
- Measure tolerates lower growth if poor can grow faster.
- Upward mobility  $\neq$  overall welfare.

#### **Theorem 1**

An upward mobility kernel is growth progressive if and only if it can be written

as

$$M(\mathbf{z}) = \sum_{i=1}^{n} \phi_i(\mathbf{y}) g_i$$

for continuous permutation-invariant  $\{\phi_i\}$ , with  $\phi_i(\mathbf{y}) > \phi_j(\mathbf{y})$  when  $y_i < y_j$ .

Proof Outline

Income Neutrality.  $M(\mathbf{y}, \mathbf{g}) = M(\lambda \mathbf{y}, \mathbf{g})$  for all  $\lambda > 0$ .

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- Income Neutrality.  $M(\mathbf{y}, \mathbf{g}) = M(\lambda \mathbf{y}, \mathbf{g})$  for all  $\lambda > 0$ .
- $\label{eq:growth} \mbox{Growth Alignment. } \mathbf{g} > \mathbf{g}' \Rightarrow M(\mathbf{y},\mathbf{g}) > M(\mathbf{y},\mathbf{g}') \mbox{ all } \mathbf{y}.$

#### Independent Pairwise Growth Tradeoffs:

Is  $M((y_i, g_i), (y_j, g_j), (\mathbf{y}_{-ij}, \mathbf{g}_{-ij})) \ge M((y_i, g'_i), (y_j, g'_j), (\mathbf{y}_{-ij}, \mathbf{g}_{-ij}))$ ?

Answer insensitive to  $(\mathbf{y}_{-ij}, \mathbf{g}_{-ij})$ .

#### **Theorem 2**

Under additional three axioms and  $n \ge 3$ , M can be written as:

$$M_{\alpha}(\mathbf{z}) = \frac{\sum_{i=1}^{n} y_{i}^{-\alpha} g_{i}}{\sum_{i=1}^{n} y_{i}^{-\alpha}}, \text{ for some } \alpha > 0.$$

Proof employs a substantial extension of Gorman's separability theorem;

**See** Chatterjee ( ) Ray ( ) Sen (2021).

# **Income Trajectories**



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#### Towards a measure on trajectories:



•  $\mathbf{y}[s,t] = \{y_i(\tau)_s^t\}_{i=1}^n$ 

• Upward mobility measure:  $\mu(\mathbf{y}[s,t])$ .

# Reducibility

- Assume  $\mathbf{y}[s,t]$  continuously differentiable. Then:
- Well-defined  $\mathbf{z}(\tau) = (\mathbf{y}(\tau), \mathbf{g}(\tau))$  for each  $\tau \in [s, t]$ .
- Well-defined  $M(\mathbf{z}(\tau))$  for each  $\tau \in [s, t]$ .

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- Well-defined  $M(\mathbf{z}(\tau))$  for each  $\tau \in [s, t]$ .
- µ is reducible if it's expressible as a function of all these M's:

$$\mu(\mathbf{y}[s,t]) = \Psi(\{M(\mathbf{z}(\tau))\}_s^t)$$

with  $\mu(\mathbf{y}[s,t]) = m$  whenever  $M(\mathbf{z}(\tau)) = m$  for all  $\tau \in [s,t]$  (normalization)

# Additivity



 $\mu$  is **additive** if for all s < u < t,

$$(t-s)\mu(\mathbf{y}[s,t]) = (u-s)\mu(\mathbf{y}[s,u]) + (t-u)\mu(\mathbf{y}[u,t]).$$

#### Theorem 3

Kernel axioms, reducibility, and additivity hold if and only if

$$\mu_{\alpha}(\mathbf{y}[s,t]) = \frac{1}{t-s} \ln \left[ \frac{\sum_{i=1}^{n} y_i^{-\alpha}(t)}{\sum_{i=1}^{n} y_i^{-\alpha}(s)} \right]^{-\frac{1}{\alpha}} \text{ for some } \alpha > 0.$$

Remark: Can also use income categories and population shares (see paper).

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In what follows, we look at different aspects of this measure.

# Upward Mobility as Change in Welfare

#### Mobility measure:

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Atkinson welfare function, or Atkinson equivalent income:

$$a_{\alpha}(\mathbf{y}) = \left(\frac{1}{n}\sum_{j=1}^{n} y_{j}^{-\alpha}\right)^{-\frac{1}{\alpha}},$$

for  $\alpha > 0$  (elasticity restricted).

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#### for $\alpha > 0$ (elasticity restricted).

- $\mu_{\alpha}(\mathbf{y}[s,t]) =$ average growth of Atkinson equiv income on [s,t].
- Not a measure of equality per se.

# **Upward Mobility as Pro-Poor Growth**

Upward Mobility = 
$$\frac{1}{t-s} \ln \left[ \frac{\sum_{j=1}^{n} y_j(t)^{-\alpha}}{\sum_{j=1}^{m} y_j(s)^{-\alpha}} \right]^{-\frac{1}{\alpha}}$$
  
Growth =  $\frac{1}{t-s} \ln \left[ \frac{\sum_{j=1}^{n} y_j(t)}{\sum_{j=1}^{m} y_j(s)} \right]$ 

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### **Upward Mobility as Pro-Poor Growth**

$$\begin{array}{l} \textbf{Upward Mobility} = \frac{1}{t-s} \ln \left[ \frac{\sum_{j=1}^{n} y_j(t)^{-\alpha}}{\sum_{j=1}^{m} y_j(s)^{-\alpha}} \right]^{-\frac{1}{\alpha}} \\ \textbf{Growth} \qquad = \frac{1}{t-s} \ln \left[ \frac{\sum_{j=1}^{n} y_j(t)}{\sum_{j=1}^{m} y_j(s)} \right] = \mu_{-1}(\mathbf{y}[s,t]) \end{array}$$

Isn't even on our "boundary" as  $\alpha \to 0$ .

Nevertheless, when all growth rates are the same,  $\mu_{\alpha} =$  growth rate.

# **Discontinuous Trajectories**

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Approximate by smooth functions and use continuity: same answer.

#### Relative upward mobility nets out growth:

$$\rho_{\alpha}(\mathbf{y}[s,t]) = \mu_{\alpha}(\mathbf{y}[s,t]) - \frac{1}{t-s} \left[ \ln(\bar{y}(t)) - \ln(\bar{y}(s)) \right]$$
$$= \frac{1}{t-s} \ln \left[ \frac{\sum_{i=1}^{n} e_i(t)^{-\alpha}}{\sum_{i=1}^{n} e_i(s)^{-\alpha}} \right]^{-\frac{1}{\alpha}}$$
(1)

where  $e_i = y_i/\bar{y}$  is excess growth factor relative to per-capita income  $\bar{y}$ .

•  $\rho_{\alpha}$  admissible under Theorem **??**; can be further axiomatized.

We now arrive at a central point of the paper:

• Upward Mobility 
$$= \frac{1}{t-s} \ln \left[ \frac{\sum_{j=1}^{n} y_j(t)^{-\alpha}}{\sum_{j=1}^{m} y_j(s)^{-\alpha}} \right]^{-\frac{1}{\alpha}}$$
 is panel independent.

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- **Answer:** To assess a family's changing fortunes, *that* family must be tracked.
- But to assess upward mobility overall, it is *society* that must be tracked.
- A family receives time-varying weights depending on its relative location.
- The impact on overall mobility feeds through the impact on mobility kernels.
- Such nimble weight switches are central to our argument.

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Specifically, study how the axioms work:

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- Reducibility  $\Rightarrow$

$$\mu(\mathbf{y}[s,t]) = \Psi\left(\left\{\sum_{i=1}^{n} \phi_i(\mathbf{y}(\tau))g_i(\tau)\right\}_s^t\right) = \Psi\left(\left\{\sum_{i=1}^{n} \frac{\phi_i(\mathbf{y}(\tau))}{y_i(\tau)}\dot{y}_i(\tau)\right\}_s^t\right)$$

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• Additivity  $\Rightarrow$ 

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•  $\frac{\phi_i(\mathbf{y})}{y_i} = \frac{y_i^{-\alpha-1}}{\sum_j y_j^{-\alpha}}$ , which integrates out to Atkinson welfare. (Jumps?)







- Different exchange mobility or pure movement.
- 🔹 Different inequalities. 🗸
- But **upward** mobility in both panels is zero.

- 2. But what about mobility as pure movement "back and forth"?
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where 
$$M_{\alpha}^{+}(\mathbf{z}) = \sum_{i=1}^{n} \phi_{i}^{+}(\mathbf{y}) \max\{g_{i}, 0\}$$
 and  $M_{\alpha}^{-}(\mathbf{z}) = \sum_{i=1}^{n} \phi_{i}^{-}(\mathbf{y}) \max\{-g_{i}, 0\}.$ 

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 and  $M_{\alpha}^{-}(\mathbf{z}) = \sum_{i=1}^{n} \phi_{i}^{-}(\mathbf{y}) \max\{-g_{i}, 0\}$ .  
•  $E_{\alpha}(\mathbf{z}) = \sum_{i=1}^{n} \phi_{i}(\mathbf{y})|g_{i}| = M_{\alpha}^{+}(\mathbf{z}) + M_{\alpha}^{-}(\mathbf{z})$ 

- Our preferred approach to exchange mobility.
- Such a measure would not be panel-independent.

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- Or some other measure of permanent income (time-averaged?).
- Similar recommendations apply to poverty or inequality measurement.

**4.** But even then, individuals may belong to different **social** groups. How do we take that into account?
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Social Growth Progressivity. For any z, i and j with  $(y_i, w_{k(i)}) \leq (y_j, w_{k(j)})$ , form z' by altering  $g_i$  to  $g_i + \epsilon$  and  $g_j$  to  $g_j - \epsilon$ . Then  $M(\mathbf{z}') > M(\mathbf{z})$ .

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Social Binary Growth Tradeoffs. For any i, j, any  $(y_i, y_j, w_{k(i)}, w_{k(j)})$ , comparing  $((y_i, w_{k(i)}, g_i), (y_j, w_{k(j)}, g_j), (\mathbf{y}_{-ij}, \mathbf{g}_{-ij}, \mathbf{w}_{-k(i),k(j)}))$  and  $((y_i, w_{k(i)}, g'_i), (y_j, w_{k(j)}, g'_j), (\mathbf{y}_{-ij}, \mathbf{g}_{-ij}, \mathbf{w}_{-k(i),k(j)})))$  is insensitive to  $(\mathbf{y}_{-ij}, \mathbf{g}_{-ij}, \mathbf{w}_{-k(i),k(j)}))$ .

#### 4, contd.

#### Theorem 4

The above axioms hold if and only if for  $n \ge 3$  and groupings K,

$$\mu_{\alpha,\beta}(\mathbf{y}[s,t],K) = \frac{1}{t-s} \left\{ \ln\left[\frac{\sum_{i=1}^{n} y_i(t)^{-\alpha} w_{k(i)}(t)^{-\beta}}{\sum_{i=1}^{n} y_i(s)^{-\alpha} w_{k(i)}(s)^{-\beta}}\right]^{-1/\alpha} - \frac{\beta}{\alpha} \int_s^t \frac{\sum_{k \in K} n_k w_k(\tau)^{-\beta} a_k(\tau)^{-\alpha} g_k(\tau)}{\sum_{k \in K} n_k w_k(\tau)^{-\beta} a_k(\tau)^{-\alpha} d\tau} d\tau \right\},$$

for some  $(\alpha, \beta) \gg 0$ , where  $a_k(\tau)$  is Atkinson equivalent group income.

- First term on RHS is panel-independent.
- Second term depends on trajectories, but only at the group level.
- Can approximate group Atkinson by standard inequality measures (see paper).

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- Answer: No.
- For the United States, Chetty et al (2017) estimate:
- % population share: children > parents (US birth cohorts, 1940–84).
- Transitions estimated from a unique panel of tax records
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- For the United States, Chetty et al (2017) estimate:
- % population share: children > parents (US birth cohorts, 1940–84).
- Transitions estimated from a unique panel of tax records
- ⊕ marginal income distributions from CPS and Census.
- Generally very hard to get hold of.
- Though similar studies exist for other countries; e.g., Acciari et al (2021).

Skip?

The Chetty et al (2017) measure (also Berman 2021, Acciari et al 2021):

$$\mu^{\mathsf{c}}(\mathbf{y}[0,1]) = \sum_{i=1}^{n} I(y_i(0), y_i(1)).$$

- where  $I(y_i(0), y_i(1))$  is indicator for  $y_i(0) < y_i(1)$ .
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- Population share for whom future  $\succ$  present.
- The Fields-Ok (1999) measure:

$$\mu^{\text{FO}}(\mathbf{z}) = \frac{1}{n} \sum_{i=1}^{n} \left[ \ln(y_i(0)) - \ln(y_i(1)) \right] = \frac{1}{n} \sum_{i=1}^{n} \left[ \int_0^1 g_i(\tau) d\tau \right].$$

Both must fail growth progressivity.

#### **Example for** $\mu^{c}$ :

- Two persons at incomes \$10,000 and \$20,000.
- Growth rates 1% for both. Then  $\mu^{c} = 1$ .
- Transfer 2 points of growth from rich to poor. Then  $\mu^{c} = 1/2$ .
- But growth progressivity asks that mobility must rise.

#### Rank-weighted measures:

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#### Rank-weighted measures:

- Such measures fail our axioms in a seemingly technical way:
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- Tiny changes in incomes can generate discrete jumps in mobility.
- And worse: large changes in *relative* income could go unnoticed.
- Our measure is indeed correlated with rank-based measures.
- But is sensitive throughout, without being unduly affected by a rank switch.

- **Chetty et al (2017) estimate**  $M^{I}(\mathbf{z})$  for US birth cohorts, 1940–84.
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- They estimate a copula from a unique panel of tax records.
- In practice, the dependence on exact copulas seems limited; Berman (2021)

"Estimating the absolute mobility in the United States with different copulas, some of which are very different from the one characterizing the United States, results in a similar evolution in time."

## $\mu_{lpha}$ Compared to Chetty et al (2017) for the United States



- Robust to different  $\alpha$ .
- Robust to using other publicly available databases (e.g., WID).

#### Ten-year upward mobility in Brazil, India and France:

- Data from the World Inequality Database (repeated cross-sections).
- Measure  $\mu_{0.5}(\mathbf{y}[t,t+10])$  and  $\rho_{0.5}(\mathbf{y}[t,t+10])$ .
- Robust with respect to choice of α (see paper).

## Upward Mobility in Brazil, India and France



## **Ongoing Research: Distribution and Mobility**

Esteban, Genicot, Mayoral, Ray (in preparation)

#### How does distribution affect subsequent mobility?

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- Mechanical mean reversion
- Classical convergence: convex technology

# **Ongoing Research: Distribution and Mobility**

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- How does distribution affect subsequent mobility?
- Distribution ⊕ future mobility?
- Mechanical mean reversion
- Classical convergence: convex technology
- Distribution ⊖ future mobility?
- Classical poverty traps: missing credit markets, nonconvexities.
- Psychological traps:  $\beta$ - $\delta$ , aspirations failure

#### • High inequality is correlated with low mobility Krueger (2012)



#### High inequality is correlated with low mobility Krueger (2012)



Krueger (2021) / Corak (2013)

Using  $\mu_{0.5}$ 

#### Does the cross-section hold up? No.

86 countries (WID); 1985-2015: Genicot () Ray () Concha-Arriagada



Absolute mobility  $\alpha = 0.5$ 

Relative mobility  $\alpha = 0.5$ 

- But the expansion of data allows us to **exploit panel structure**.
- Preliminary: 4-period panel (1980, 1990, 2000, 2010), 174 countries (WID)

	Absolute Upward Mobility, $\alpha=0.5$ [t, t+10]					
	[1]	[2]	[3]	[4]		
GINI	1.875 (0.000)	2.391 (0.000)				
ATKINSON			1.881 (0.000)	2.299 (0.000)		
$log(income)_t$		-6.879 (0.000)		-6.873 (0.000)		
с	-10.096 (0.000)	5.795 (0.033)	-12.489 (0.000)	3.414 (0.226)		
$R^2$	0.096	0.404	0.104	0.411		
Obs	696	696	696	696		
Estimation	FE	FE	FE	FE		

All regressions with year effects and country FE. Standard errors clustered at the country level. *p*-values in parentheses.

- But the expansion of data allows us to **exploit panel structure**.
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	Relative Upward Mobility, $\alpha=0.5$ [t, t+10]				
	[1]	[2]	[3]	[4]	
$GINI_t$	1.505 (0.000)	1.511 (0.000)			
<b>ATKINSON</b> <sub>t</sub>			1.567 (0.000)	1.572 (0.000)	
$log(income)_t$		-0.074 (0.532)		-0.081 (0.523)	
С	-8.324 (0.000)	-8.154 (0.000)	-10.640 (0.000)	-10.452 (0.000)	
$R^2$	0.164	0.164	0.213	0.213	
Obs	696	696	696	696	
Estimation	FE	FE	FE	FE	

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If convincing, this significantly expands the scope of empirical inquiry

## **Population Consistency**

Given:  $z = (y_1, g_1, ..., y_k, g_k, ..., y_n, g_n)$ 

$$\mathbf{z}' = (y_1, g_1, \dots, y_k, g_k - \epsilon, \dots, y_n, g_n)$$

$$\mathbf{z}'' = (y_1, g_1, \dots, y_k, g_k + \epsilon, \dots, y_n, g_n)$$

and  $\mathbf{z}'$  and  $\mathbf{z}''$  have average mobility distinct from  $\mathbf{z}$ :  $\frac{1}{2}[M(\mathbf{z}') + M(\mathbf{z}'')] \neq M(\mathbf{z})$ ,

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Then:

$$M(\mathbf{z}' \oplus \mathbf{z}'') \neq M(\mathbf{z} \oplus \mathbf{z}).$$

Step 1. For every k,  $m(g_k) \equiv M(g_k | \mathbf{y}, \mathbf{g}_{-k})$  is affine in  $g_k$ , or equivalently:  $m(g_k) = \frac{1}{2} \left[ m(g_k - \epsilon) + m(g_k + \epsilon) \right] \text{ for every } \epsilon > 0.$  Step 1. For every k,  $m(g_k) \equiv M(g_k | \mathbf{y}, \mathbf{g}_{-k})$  is affine in  $g_k$ , or equivalently:

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 for every  $\epsilon > 0$ .

- Suppose false for some  $g_k$  and  $\epsilon$ .
- Define  $\mathbf{z} = (\mathbf{y}, \mathbf{g}_{-k}, g_k)$ ,  $\mathbf{z}' = (\mathbf{y}, \mathbf{g}_{-k}, g_k \epsilon)$ , and  $\mathbf{z}'' = (\mathbf{y}, \mathbf{g}_{-k}, g_k + \epsilon)$ .
- . Then  $M(\mathbf{z}') + M(\mathbf{z}'') \neq M(\mathbf{z}) + M(\mathbf{z}).$
- By Local Merge,  $M(\mathbf{z}' \oplus \mathbf{z}'') \neq M(\mathbf{z} \oplus \mathbf{z}).$
- Say  $M(\mathbf{z}' \oplus \mathbf{z}'') > M(\mathbf{z} \oplus \mathbf{z}).$

# **Appendix: Proof of Theorem 1**




Step 2. (Gallier 1999) M(z) multiaffine so can be written as:

$$M(\mathbf{z}) = \sum_{S} \phi_{S}(\mathbf{y}) \left[ \prod_{j \in S} g_{j} \right].$$

for a collection  $\{\phi_S\}$  defined for every  $\emptyset \neq S \subset \{1, \dots, n\}$ .

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#### Step 3. All nontrivial product terms above must have zero coefficients.

Suppose  $\{ij\} \subset S$  for some S with  $\phi_S(\mathbf{y}) \neq 0$ . We will only move  $g_i$  and  $g_j$  but with  $g_i + g_j = G$ , so hold all else fixed and write

$$M(\mathbf{y}, \mathbf{g}) = \alpha g_i (G - g_i) + \beta g_i + \gamma (G - g_i) + \delta.$$

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$$M(\mathbf{y}, \mathbf{g}) = \alpha g_i (G - g_i) + \beta g_i + \gamma (G - g_i) + \delta.$$

$$\Rightarrow \frac{\partial M(\mathbf{y}, \mathbf{g})}{\partial g_i} - \frac{\partial M(\mathbf{y}, \mathbf{g})}{\partial g_j} = \alpha G - 2\alpha g_i + \beta - \gamma.$$

Choose G and  $g_i$  to violate Growth Progressivity.