Metaphysics
Problem Set 4
Due date: October 9th, 2002.

Use your own words. No quotation, no paraphrase.
Please type and staple your answers.

1. Consider the following theory about the nature of redness and greenness: for a surface to be red is for it to have a relatively fine-grained grid shape (like a microscopic waffle); for a surface to be green is for it to have a somewhat coarser (though still microscopically fine) grid shape (cf. Armstrong, p. 279).

(i) State any ONE argument against this theory. The argument you choose should not appeal to any empirical discoveries in physics or color-science—pretend, if you like, that we're having this discussion in the seventeenth century.
(ii) How should the proponent of the "grid" theory best respond to this argument? Is this response successful?

2. According to Armstrong,

> ...we must admit that a real change in quality occurs at surfaces that, as we *say*, 'appear to change' when conditions of illumination are changed. (p. 284)

What does Armstrong mean by this claim, and how does he argue for it? Is the argument successful?

3. 'No material objects are *unique red*, that is, red without being at all bluish or yellowish. For any object that looks unique red to one person will look slightly bluish or yellowish to most others, under the same viewing conditions. And it would be intolerably arbitrary to suppose that all but a few lucky people are subject to systematic illusion as regards which things are unique red.' Discuss. What impact should this argument have on our theory of the colors of material objects?