

Cian Dorr
Curriculum Vitae
1 March 2023

New York University
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New York, NY 10003

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Employment

from 2013: New York University, Professor
2012–2013: University of Oxford, Professor of Philosophy
2008–2012: University of Oxford, Senior Faculty Lecturer
2007–2008: University of Pittsburgh, Associate Professor
2003–2007: University of Pittsburgh, Assistant Professor
2000–2003: New York University, Assistant Professor

Education

1995–2000: Princeton University, Ph.D. in Philosophy (awarded January 2002)
1994–95: Technische Universität, Berlin, visiting student
1993–94: University College, Cork, M.A. in Philosophy
1990–93: University College, Cork, B.A. in Philosophy and English

Areas of specialization

Metaphysics, Philosophical Logic, Epistemology, Philosophy of Language, Philosophy of Physics

Awards and distinctions

Petrus Hispanus Lecturer (University of Lisbon), 2022
Hempel Lecturer (Princeton University), 2020
Article ‘Against Counterfactual Miracles’ selected for *Philosopher’s Annual*, 2016
Charles E. Ryskamp Research Fellowship, American Council of Learned Societies, 2007–2008
Whiting Fellowship, Princeton University, 1999–2000

Books

1. *The Bounds of Possibility: Puzzles of Modal Variation* (with John Hawthorne and Juhani Yli-Vakkuri)
Oxford University Press, 2021.

Published and forthcoming articles and book chapters

30. ‘Does Non-Measurability Favour Imprecision?’
Forthcoming in *Mind*.
29. ‘Classicism’ (with Andrew Bacon)
Forthcoming in *Higher-Order Metaphysics*, ed. Peter Fritz and Nick Jones (Oxford University Press).
28. ‘The Case for Comparability’ (with Jacob M. Nebel and Jake Zuehl)
Noûs 57 (2023): 414–53.

27. 'Consequences of Comparability' (with Jacob M. Nebel and Jake Zuehl)
Philosophical Perspectives 35 (2021): 70–98..
26. 'Solving a Paradox of Evidential Equivalence' (with John Hawthorne and Yoaav Isaacs)
Mind 130.520 (2021): 1159–82.
25. 'Diamonds Are Forever' (with Jeremy Goodman)
Notis 54.3 (2020): 632–65.
24. 'Self-Locating Priors and Cosmological Measures' (with Frank Arntzenius)
In *The Philosophy of Cosmology*, ed. Khalil Chamcham, John Barrow, Simon Saunders, and Joe Silk (Cambridge University Press, 2017): 396–428.
23. 'To Be F Is To Be G'
Philosophical Perspectives 30 (2016): 39–134.
22. 'Against Counterfactual Miracles'
Philosophical Review 125 (2016): 241–86.
21. 'How Vagueness Could Cut Out at Any Order'
Review of Symbolic Logic 8 (2015): 1–10.
20. 'Quantifier Variance and the Collapse Theorems'
The Monist 97 (2014): 503–70.
19. 'Semantic Plasticity and Speech Reports' (with John Hawthorne)
Philosophical Review 123 (2014): 281–338.
18. 'Transparency and the Context-Sensitivity of Attitude Reports'
In *Empty Representations: Reference and Non-Existence*, ed. Manuel García-Carpintero and Genoveva Martí (Oxford University Press, 2014): 25–66.
17. 'Knowing Against the Odds' (with Jeremy Goodman and John Hawthorne)
Philosophical Studies 170 (2014): 277–87.
16. 'Embedding Epistemic Modals' (with John Hawthorne)
Mind 122 (2013): 867–913.
15. 'Naturalness' (with John Hawthorne)
Oxford Studies in Metaphysics 8 (2013): 3–77.
14. 'Calculus as Geometry' (with Frank Arntzenius)
In Frank Arntzenius, *Space, Time, and Stuff* (Oxford University Press, 2011).
13. 'De Re A Priori Knowledge'
Mind 120 (2011): 939–91.
12. 'Physical Geometry and Fundamental Metaphysics'
Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 111 (2011): 135–59.
11. 'The Eternal Coin: A Puzzle about Self-locating Conditional Credence'
Philosophical Perspectives 25 (2010): 189–205.
10. 'Of Numbers and Electrons'
Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 110 (2010): 133–81.
9. 'Iterating Definiteness'
In *Cuts and Clouds: Vagueness, its Nature, and its Logic*, ed. Richard Dietz and Sebastiano Moruzzi (Oxford University Press, 2010): 550–75.
8. 'There Are No Abstract Objects'
In *Contemporary Debates in Metaphysics*, ed. John Hawthorne, Theodore Sider, and Dean Zimmerman (Blackwell, 2007): 32–64.
7. 'Propositions and Counterpart Theory'
Analysis 65 (2005): 210–18.
6. 'What We Disagree About When We Disagree About Ontology'
In *Fictionalist Approaches to Metaphysics*, ed. Mark Kalderon (Oxford University Press, 2005): 234–86.

5. 'Non-symmetric Relations'
Oxford Studies in Metaphysics 1 (2004): 155–92.
4. 'Vagueness Without Ignorance'
Philosophical Perspectives 17 (2003): 83–113.
3. 'Composition as a Fiction' (with Gideon Rosen)
In *The Blackwell Guide to Metaphysics*, ed. Richard M. Gale (Blackwell, 2002): 151–74.
2. 'Sleeping Beauty: In Defence of Elga'
Analysis 62 (2002): 292–96.
1. 'Non-cognitivism and Wishful Thinking'
Noûs 36 (2002): 97–103.

Reviews, discussions, and encyclopedia articles

7. 'Natural Properties'
Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, Fall 2019 Edition, ed. Edward N. Zalta: <https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/natural-properties/>.
6. 'Contingent Existence and Iterated Modality' (discussion of *Modality and Explanatory Reasoning* by Boris Kment).
Analysis 77 (2017): 155–65.
5. Review of *The Construction of Logical Space* by Agustín Rayo
Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews (2014.06.33): <https://ndpr.nd.edu/news/the-construction-of-logical-space/>.
4. 'Reading *Writing the Book of the World*' (discussion of *Writing the Book of the World* by Theodore Sider)
Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 87 (2013): 717–24.
3. Review of *Every Thing Must Go: Metaphysics Naturalized* by James Ladyman and Don Ross, with David Spurrett and John Collier,
Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews (2010.06.16): <https://ndpr.nd.edu/news/every-thing-must-go-metaphysics-naturalized/>.
2. Review of *Resemblance Nominalism: A Solution to the Problem of Universals* by Gonzalo Rodriguez-Pereyra
Mind 114 (2005): 457–61.
1. 'Merricks on the Existence of Human Organisms' (discussion of Trenton Merricks' *Objects and Persons*)
Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 67 (2003): 711–18.

Talks and conference presentations

- 'Truthmaker Semantics as Metaphysics' (with Ethan Russo)
HomeWork 3 (USC): June 2022
- Petrus Hispanus Lectures: 'Higher-Order Quantification and the Elimination of Objects'
University of Lisbon: April 2022
- 'Type-Neutral Generality and Semantic Ascent'
Vancouver (Pacific APA): April 2022
- 'The Case for Comparability'
Toronto: October 2021; New York Philosophy of Language Workshop: October 2021.
- 'Plural Signification and Semantic Paradox'
Cambridge (Moral Sciences Club): March 2021

‘Metaphysical Necessity is the Broadest Necessity’

University of Texas: March 2021

Hempel Lectures: ‘The Multiplicity of Meaning’

Princeton: September 2020

‘One Way of Getting Rid of Things: Higher-Order Languages, Priorian Nominalism, and Nihilism’

Rutgers (workshop on structural realism): May 2017; Notre Dame: March 2018; Sun Valley, Idaho (Inland Northwest Philosophy Conference, March 2020).

‘What To Expect in an Infinite World’ (with Frank Arntzenius)

Tenerife (‘Establishing the Philosophy of Cosmology’ conference): September 2014;

MIT: November 2014; USC (Templeton workshop on fine-tuning): March 2019; Rutgers (Foundations of Probability group): February 2020.

‘Meaning as Multiple’

Tokyo (metasemantics workshop): October 2018.

‘Reconciling Time’s Passage with the Block Universe, Using Counterpart Theory’

USC: April 2018.

‘Semantics, Physics, and the Metaphysics of Time’

Yale (Metaphysics and Semantics conference): April 2017.

‘Diamonds Are Forever’

USC (‘Linguistics for Metaphysics’ conference): January 2013; Oxford (Jowett society): February 2015;

Yale (graduate conference keynote address): April 2015; Rutgers (Semantics Workshop): October 2016.

‘To Be F Is To Be G’

Barcelona (PERSP): March 2010; Princeton: April 2011; St Andrews (Arché conference on philosophical methodology): June 2012; Hamburg (*Phlox* conference on fundamentality): July 2013; NYU (‘Modal and logical space’ workshop): April 2014; Tucson (Ranch metaphysics workshop): January 2016; Oslo (‘Higher order metaphysics’ workshop): June 2016.

‘Reconciling the Block Universe and the Privileged Present’

Gargnano (‘Metaphysical Questions’ conference): October 2015

‘Pinning Down the Meanings of Quantifiers’

Oxford (‘Verbal Disputes and their Philosophical Significance’ conference): May 2015

‘Are Quantities Qualitative?’

NYU (conference on the metaphysics of quantity): May 2015

‘Against Counterfactual Miracles’

Cornell: January 2014; Columbia (Marc Sanders Foundation conference): April 2014; U.Mass. Amherst: October 2014

‘Embedding Epistemic Modals’ (with John Hawthorne)

Rutgers: November 2013

‘The A-theory, the B-theory, and Temporal Counterpart Theory’

St. Andrews: February 2012; MIT: April 2012; Birmingham: September 2012; Bristol: December 2012; Barcelona (PERSP): May 2013

‘The Eternal Coin: A Puzzle about Self-Locating Conditional Credence’

Princeton (CRNAP ‘Probability week’ workshop): April 2013

‘Semantic Plasticity’

Nottingham: December 2011; Michigan: April 2012

‘Natural Properties: A Guide for the Perplexed’

Geneva: November 2010; St Andrews: October 2011

‘Propositional Profusion and Semantic Plasticity’ and ‘Propositional Profusion and the Liar’

Ardtornish (Arché workshop on propositions): May 2011

- 'Nominalising Differential Geometry with Fibre Bundles' (with Frank Arntzenius)
Oxford (Philosophy of Physics Seminar): May 2011
- 'How to Be a Modal Realist'
Geneva: June 2009; London (Institute of Philosophy): December 2009; Princeton: April 2010; U.Mass. Amherst (*On the Plurality of Worlds* conference): April 2011
- 'Finding Ordinary Objects in Some Quantum Worlds'
SUNY Buffalo: November 2005; NYU: December 2005; Pittsburgh: March 2006; Toronto: May 2006; Arizona (Arizona Ontology Conference): January 2007; Rutgers ('Physics Meets Metaphysics'): October 2007; Bristol: October 2010
- 'Transparency and the Context-sensitivity of Attitude Reports'
Ohio State: September 2007; Brown: December 2007; Barcelona (LOGOS workshop on singular thought): January 2009; Glasgow: September 2010; Oslo (Arché workshop on contextualism and relativism): September 2010
- 'Time, Topology and Physical Geometry'
Dublin (Joint Session of Mind Association and Aristotelian Society): June 2010
- 'Of Numbers and Electrons'
Texas: January 2005; MIT: April 2005; Eastern APA: December 2005; London (Aristotelian Society): January 2010; Cardiff: February 2010
- 'Why Must a Duplicate of an Electron Be an Electron?'
Bremen (GAP. 7 conference): September 2009
- 'Belief about Chance'
Pittsburgh: April 2006; Cambridge (Moral Sciences Club): April 2009; Oxford (Philosophy of Physics Seminar): June 2009
- 'Can There Be Only One? Eli Hirsch meets J. H. Harris'
Birmingham (Workshop on quantifier variance): June 2009
- 'Definition and Modality'
Rutgers (Metaphysical Mayhem): July 2008; Leeds: November 2008
- 'Some Rational Constraints on Self-Locating Belief'
Oxford: January 2008
- 'De Re A Priori Knowledge'
Cornell: October 2003; USC: December 2006
- 'Rationality, Self-locating Belief, and Many-Worlds Interpretations of Quantum Mechanics'
Rutgers September 2006
- 'Are Vague Predicates Definable?'
St Andrews (Arché workshop on vagueness): September 2004
- 'There Are No Abstract Objects'
Pittsburgh: April 2004
- 'What We Disagree About When We Disagree About Ontology'
North Carolina, Toronto, Notre Dame, Colorado, Pittsburgh: January–February 2003; Bellingham Summer Philosophy Conference: August 2003
- 'Vagueness Without Ignorance'
NYU: April 2003
- 'Primitive Predicates'
CUNY: November 2001
- 'On the Existence of Complex Properties'
Syracuse (Metaphysical Mayhem): August 2001
- 'Composite Objects and Causal Efficacy'
Bled Conference, Slovenia: June 2001

‘Non-cognitivism and Wishful Thinking’

Pacific APA: April 2000

‘Mereology as a Fiction’

UC Santa Cruz, NYU, U. Mass. Amherst, Tufts, Arizona State: January–February 2000

‘Spreading It Thick: Hume on the Impression of Necessary Connection’

Cork (Hume Society): July 1999

‘Is Consequentialism Trivial?’

ANU, Sydney: August 1998

‘Non-symmetric Relations’

Sydney (Australasian Association of Philosophy): July 1998

Comments and replies (selected)

Replies to Maeghan Fairchild and Jason Turner (with John Hawthorne)

APA Central (Author Meets Critics on *The Bounds of Possibility*): February 2023

Phillip Bricker, *Modal Matters: Essays in Metaphysics*

APA Central: February 2021

Samuel Elgin, ‘Does Definition Admit of Substitution?’

APA Eastern: January 2020

Alexandru Radulescu, ‘Token-Reflexivity and Repetition’

APA Eastern: January 2019

Gabe Greenberg, ‘The Structure of Visual Content’

Philosophy Mountain Workshop: March 2018

David Mark Kovacs, ‘The Unification Theory of Metaphysical Explanation’

Idaho (Metaphysics on the Mountain conference): March 2017

Matt Duncan, ‘Partial Relations Are Not Transitive’

Eastern APA: January 2016

Gordon Belot, ‘Fifty Million Elvis Fans Can’t Be Wrong’

Tucson (Ranch Metaphysics Workshop): January 2015

Agustín Rayo, *The Construction of Logical Space*

NYU (‘Modal and Logical Space’ workshop): April 2014

Bradley Rettler, ‘A Simple Coincidence Puzzle’

Pacific APA: April 2014

Dan Korman, ‘Debunking Perceptual Beliefs about Ordinary Objects’

Sun Valley, Idaho (Inland Northwest Philosophy Conference): March 2014

Nathan Salmon, ‘Lambda in Sentences with Designators’

NYU Florence (workshop on propositions): June 2010

David Chalmers, ‘Ontological Anti-Realism’

Boise (Inland Northwest Philosophy Conference): March 2007

Frank Arntzenius, ‘Lewis on Locality’

Syracuse Workshop in Metaphysics: August 2003

Matthew Phillips, ‘On What a Solution to the Problem of Empty Names Cannot Be’

Pacific APA: April 2001

Teaching

Undergraduate:

Advanced Logic: 2017, 2018, 2020, 2022

Senior Thesis Seminar: 2013, 2021

Advanced Seminar (Probability in Philosophy): 2018
 Topics in Language and Mind (Conditionals): 2017
 Junior Honors Proseminar: 2017, 2018
 Knowledge and Reality (Metaphysics): 2009, 2010, 2012
 Epistemic Paradoxes: 2006
 Introduction to Philosophical Problems: 2005, 2007
 Introduction to Logic: 2004
 Scepticism: 2003
 Hume: 2002
 Metaphysics: 2001, 2002, 2004, 2006, 2007, 2016
 Philosophy of Mind: 2000

Graduate seminars:

Mind and Language Seminar (with Hartry Field): 2023
 Conditionals (with Matt Mandelkern): 2021
 Advanced Introduction to Metaphysics: 2020
 Fineness of Grain: 2019
 Mind and Language Seminar (with Jim Pryor): 2018
 Philosophy of Mathematics (with Hartry Field): 2015
 Time and Modality: 2015
 Thesis Prep Seminar: 2013
 Vagueness: 2013 (with John Hawthorne, Ofra Magidor, and Timothy Williamson)
 Conditionals: 2012 (with John Hawthorne)
 David Lewis on Language and Mind (ISSCSS summer school, Latvia): 2011
 Metaphysics: 2011
 Topics in Metaphysics: 2009 and 2010 (with John Hawthorne)
 Philosophy of Logic and Language: 2009 (with Ofra Magidor), 2011 (with Jeff Russell)
 Context-sensitivity: 2009
 Laws, Chance and Counterfactuals: 2006
 Vagueness: 2005
 Modality: 2005
 Material objects: 2003
 Proseminar: 2001 and 2002 (with Roger White); 2014 (with Hartry Field); 2016 (with Jim Pryor)
 Objectivity: 2001
 Properties: 2000

Short courses:

Theory-building in higher order languages (with Jeremy Goodman): ESSLLI, Galway 2022
 Introduction to non-extensional higher order languages and their application to propositional attitudes (with Harvey Lederman): NASSLI, USC, 2022

 Doctoral dissertations supervised (in whole or substantial part)

- Sam Lee (NYU, 2020): *The Duality of Causality*
 Andreas Ditter (NYU, 2020): *The Metaphysics and Logic of Essence*
 Trevor Teitel (NYU, 2020): *Metaphysical Possibilities in Spacetime Physics*
 Ben Holguín (NYU, 2019): *Knowledge By Constraint*
 Daniël Hoek (NYU, 2019): *The Web of Questions: Inquisitive Decision Theory and the Bounds of Rationality*
 Kyle Blumberg (NYU, 2019): *Desire, Imagination, and the Many-Layered Mind*
 Amanda Askill (NYU, 2018): *Paretian Incomparability in Infinite Ethics*
 Martín Abreu Zavaleta (NYU, 2018): *Semantic Variance*
 Daniel Waxman (NYU, 2017): *Freedom, Truth, and Consistency*
 Jeremy Goodman (NYU, 2017): *Distinctions in Reality*
 Zee Perry (NYU, 2016): *Physical Quantities: Mereology and Dynamics*
 Asya Passinsky (NYU, 2016): *The Metaphysics of Social Objects*
 Jeremy Goodman (Oxford, 2016): *The Case for Necessitism*
 Emanuel Viebahn (Oxford, 2015): *Semantic Pluralism*
 Sebastian Petzolt (Oxford, 2014): *Contextualism Challenged: Three Puzzles Concerning Indexicality and Context-Sensitivity*
 Daniel Deasy (Oxford, 2014): *Permanents: In Defence of the Moving Spotlight Theory*
 Will Lanier (Oxford, 2013): *Intentional Identity*
 Juhani Yli-Vakkuri (Oxford, 2012): *Essays on Semantic Content and Context-Sensitivity*
 Andrew Bacon (Oxford, 2012): *Indeterminacy: An Investigation into the Soritical and Semantical Paradoxes*
 Tim Willenken (Pittsburgh, 2011): *Essays on Skepticism about Epistemic Reason*
 Greg Gates (Pittsburgh, 2011): *Probabilistic Accounts of Inferential Justification: Liberalism and Inference to the Best Explanation*
 Peter Graham (NYU, 2006): *Blame, Determinism and Ignorance*
 Brad Skow (NYU, 2005): *Once Upon a Spacetime*

 Professional service

- Editorial boards: *Mind*, *Philosophical Perspectives*, *Philosophical Studies*.
 American Philosophical Association, Program Committee: 2007–8.
 Nominating Editor for *Philosopher's Annual*: 2012–21.
 ACLS Fellowship, reviewing: 2014–17.
 Sanders Prize in Metaphysics, reviewer: 2016.
 Referee: *American Philosophical Quarterly*, *Analysis*, *Analytic Philosophy*, *Australasian Journal of Philosophy*, *Blackwell Philosophy Compass*, *British Journal for the Philosophy of Science*, *Canadian Journal of Philosophy*, *Dialectica*, *Ergo*, *Ethics*, *Erkenntnis*, *Hume Studies*, *Journal of Philosophical Logic*, *Mind*, *Noûs*, *Philosopher's Imprint*, *Philosophical Papers*, *Philosophical Quarterly*, *Philosophical Review*, *Philosophical Studies*, *Philosophy and Phenomenological Research*, *Philosophy of Science*, *Synthese*, *Thought*, Blackwell Publishing, Oxford University Press.